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This article seeks to emphasize the fact that technology, like science, can also offer us explanations about 
the world. The article begins by adopting a definition of technology as knowledge, thus establishing a 
continuity between science and technology that allows us to extend the work done on the issue of 
scientific explanation. Three proposals are analyzed for defining the concept of scientific explanation, 
with emphasis on Wesley Salmon’s causal mechanical model. Next, the case of the pressure and volume 
indicator diagram in the steam engine is analyzed, in which, despite the lack of a competent scientific 
theory to interpret the data obtained through a new instrument, our technological knowledge allowed for 
the generation of the explanations that the scientific theory of the time was unable to provide. The 
example meets the demands stipulated by the causal mechanical model of explanation but differs in that 
here the explanation was not the result of scientific knowledge. Rather, it was the technological 
knowledge provided by the indicator what generated a new explanation of the steam engine’s efficiency 









Modern science has managed to explain with enormous success a wide range of 
phenomena. Classical mechanics, for example, has provided us with a scientific 
explanation of the movements of terrestrial and celestial objects that allows us to 
predict their trajectories, impacts and exchange of forces with extreme precision. The 
rationality and the effectiveness of prediction that are normally offered to us by 
scientific explanations have become, for some time now, an important theme in the 
philosophy of science. Nevertheless, it is worthy to pay attention to the fact that 
philosophy absolutely ignores that technology is also capable of offering explanations 
that are as rational and predictive-effective as the ones offered by science. 
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Indeed, science has traditionally been seen as a means to explain and predict 
phenomena while technology has been seen as a way to control and manipulate 
phenomena at will.1 In this article I will argue that this vision of science and technology 
is exceedingly strict and will defend the thesis that technology not only allows us to 
control and manipulate phenomena at will but can also offers us explanations of reality 
that are as precise and trustworthy as the ones offered by science. I will call these 
explanations “technological explanations”. 
 
 
Explanation, Science and Technology 
 
Philosophical works that refer to science and the concept of scientific explanation have 
been developing vigorously for over half a century.2 Philosophical research on 
technology however, constitutes a field that has only recently begun to be 
acknowledged by academia.3 
 
As mentioned above, it is generally accepted that one of the main tasks of science is to 
provide explanations. However, little or nothing has been explored about the kind of 
explanations that technology has offered us. To properly develop the relationship 
between explanation and technology, we will first begin by establishing a consensus 
between science and technology. For this purpose we will take as a starting point Ian 
Quallenberg’s work, The Difference Between Technology and Science4. In his work 
Quallenberg establishes a continuity between science and technology, breaking with the 
doctrines that establish hierarchical relationships between both disciplines. Under this 
perspective technology is not mere applied science, nor is science a means for obtaining 
‘pure’ knowledge. Quallenberg tells us: 
 
It is a gradual and complex relationship[…] The higher the amount in which the 
level of practicality of the objectives operates in such a way that it delimits the 
level of generality, the more the research will tend towards technology. The 
lower this amount is, the more the research will tend towards science. We use 
the verb to tend because we suppose there is a continuum between science and 
technology and not an absolute dichotomy.5 
                                                          
1 When we talk about science in this article we are referring only to the natural sciences, 
especially physics and sciences close to engineering practice. 
2 In contemporary philosophy the topic of scientific explanation dates back to Carl Hempel and 
Paul Oppenheim’s famous work, “Studies in the Logic of Explanation”, published in 1948. 
3 Hugo López Araiza Bravo, in “Cómo y por qué una filosofía de la tecnología” for example, 
drafts a history of the philosophy of technology that dates back to 1835 but finds himself in need 
to argue in the midst of 2012 in favor of the independent existence of this discipline.  
4 The original title in Spanish reads, La diferencia entre tecnología y ciencia.  
5 The original Spanish version reads “Se trata de una relación gradual y compleja[...] Entre mayor 
sea el grado en que el nivel de practicidad de los objetivos opere de tal manera que delimite el 
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In the rest of this article we will take Quallenberg’s stance on the relationship between 
science and technology in our developing of the relationship between scientific and 
technological explanations. In this way, if we think of technology as analogous to 
science, defining it as a kind of knowledge, then the concept of explanation in relation 
to technology becomes twofold. On the one hand we have the traditional relationship 
between scientific explanation and technology; on the second hand we have the concept 
of technological explanation—for if there exists a continuum between science and 
technology, and science can offer us explanations, it is plausible to think that 
technology can also do the same. 
 
To make an analysis of the two sides of the concept of explanation in technology, it will 
first be necessary to review three of the classical proposals offered by philosophers in 
relation to the features that constitute a scientific explanation. The proposals that we 
will review will be the deductive-nomological model, the unificationist models and the 
causal mechanical model.  
 
 
Hempel and the Philosophical Tradition 
 
Traditionally, the starting point for the philosophical discussion regarding scientific 
explanation is Carl Hempel’s work, Aspects of Scientific Explanation. Carl Hempel was 
the most influential advocate of the deductive-nomological model, also called DN 
model of scientific explanation. In a concise manner, the model can be characterized as 
the attempt to comprehend, under a logical structure, the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for something to be called an authentic explanation in science. Under 
Hempel’s perspective, to explain an event would be equivalent to providing a valid 





Phenomenon to be explained 
 
In the model, the premises that constitute the explanation are called explanans, while 
the conclusion or phenomenon to be explained is given the name of explanandum. The 
importance of the DN model is that it was the first modern attempt to proffer a 
definition of scientific explanation. Under Hempel’s model the explanation of an event 
is a valid deductive argument of the structure previously outlined. Within this structure 
                                                                                                                                              
nivel de generalidad, la investigación tenderá hacia la tecnología. Entre menor sea este grado, la 
investigación tenderá hacia la ciencia. Usamos la palabra tender puesto que suponemos que hay 
un continuum entre la ciencia y la tecnología y no una dicotomía absoluta.” Ian Quallenberg, “La 
diferencia entre tecnología y ciencia,” p. 246.  
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it is important to highlight the role played by the general laws as principles under which 
we can deduce—and explain—particular phenomena. Thus, for Hempel, to explain is 
the equivalent of deducing a particular phenomenon out of a general law. 
 
In spite of its initial charm, Hempel’s model failed to capture the essence of the concept 
of scientific explanation. There are cases that, while fitting the DN model, would be 
absurd to consider as authentic scientific explanations. One of the most famous 
counterexamples to Hempel’s model is the one developed by Sylvain Bromberger 
regarding a flagpole. The counterexample more less states the following6: a vertical 
flagpole of a certain height raises itself on a flat piece of land. The sun shines intensely 
and finds itself at a certain elevation to the horizon. Under these conditions the flagpole 
emits a shadow of a certain length. If we are asked to explain why the shadow is as long 
as it is, we could mention the data regarding the height of the pole and the position of 
the sun, which together with the law of rectilinear propagation of light allows us to 
deduce the length of the shadow. This deduction fulfills the DN model and it appears to 
be a legitimate explanation of the length of the shadow. The problem here is that, in a 
similar way, we could mention the data regarding the position of the sun, the length of 
the shadow and the law of rectilinear propagation of light to deduce the height of the 
flagpole. This second example, even though it fulfills perfectly the requirements of the 
DN model, fails to construct a legitimate explanation of the height of the flagpole. It is 
simply contrary to intuition to think that the length of the shadow can explain the height 
of the flagpole. The real reason of why the flagpole has the height that it does, surely 
relates with the fact that someone deliberately made it that way and not with the fact of 
the shadow having a determined length. Upon the DN model’s failure to overcome such 
counterexamples alternative models of scientific explanation have appeared. In the 
following pages we will mention two of these models: the unificationist model and the 
causal mechanical model. 
 
 
The Unificationist and the Causal Mechanical Model 
 
Michael Friedman and Philip Kitcher inherit Hempel’s nomological concerns—i. e., of 
the necessity of subsuming phenomena under general laws—and try to correct his 
errors through what is known as the ‘unificationist models’. Unificationist models of 
scientific explanation center their attention on the power that laws and scientific 
theories have of unifying phenomena that previously appeared to be unrelated. The 
main premise of these models is to state that our comprehension of the world increases 
while the number of hypothesis needed to explain it decrease. The more phenomena 
                                                          
6 Even though this counterexample is attributed to S. Bromberger it seems to never have been 
published. The version presented here is a paraphrase taken from Wesley Salmon, “Four Decades 
of Scientific Explanation”, P. Kitcher and W. Salmon (eds.), Scientific Explanation, p. 47. 
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that a law or a theory can unify, the greater its explanatory power. Thus, to explain is to 
unify in a single law or theory phenomena that were previously unrelated.  
 
On the other hand, the causal mechanical model of scientific explanation found its best 
representative in Wesley C. Salmon. Unlike Hempel’s logical model that defined 
scientific explanation as a deductive structure, Salmon develops it in terms of a causal 
structure. In this sense, to explain a phenomenon is equivalent of simply determining 
what caused it. 
 
Salmon has contended that the causal mechanical model of explanation doesn’t oppose 
the unificationist model.7 For him both models are compatible and, in a sense, 
complementary. A way of seeing this is to consider unificationist explanations as global 
explanations, i. e., that try to unify different phenomena previously unrelated within a 
general theory or a set of laws of nature, and causal explanations as local explanations, 
i. e., that focus on describing the particularities of the mechanisms that cause the 
phenomenon we are seeking to explain. 
 
However, before continuing it is necessary to go into detail on the difference that 
Salmon establishes between explaining why a phenomenon has happed and how the 
phenomenon came to occur. As we will try to demonstrate, this difference can help us 
outline certain features shared by scientific and technological explanations.  
 
 
Why and How 
 
Traditionally it has been thought that explanations are answers to why-questions. Why 
do planets move in elliptic orbits? Why does the sun hide under the horizon? These are 
questions that demand an explanation. The models we have revised are, in a sense, 
attempts to define the features that a good scientific answer should have when 
answering a why-question. 
 
Nevertheless, in repeated occasions Wesley Salmon pointed out that not always can an 
explanation request be expressed as a why-question, and that in numerous occasions the 
search for scientific explanations doesn’t respond to why but to how8. The quest for the 
how, assures Salmon, requires a description of the mechanisms that produce the 
phenomenon we seek to explain, this is, it requires a genuine causal explanation.  
 
                                                          
7 Wesley Salmon, “Scientific Explanation: Causation and Unification”. 
8 Wesley Salmon, “Four Decades of Scientific Explanation”, P. Kitcher and W. Salmon (eds.), 
Scientific Explanation, pp. 136-138; id., “Scientific Explanation: Causation and Unification”, pp. 
19, 20. 
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As we have seen there exists two models of explanation that we can currently accept in 
science. Salmon sets the following example to illustrate how it is that these two models 
respond depending on if the explanation is sought throughout a why-question or 
throughout a how-question:  
  
If one asks why a penny conducts electricity, one good answer is that it is made 
of copper, and copper is a good conductor. If one asks how this penny conducts 
electricity, it would seem that a mechanism is called for. A story about electrons 
that are free to move through the metal would be an appropriate answer. In this 
case, the why-question elicits an appeal to a general law; the how-question 
evokes a description of underlying mechanisms.9 
 
Until now we have focused on presenting the generalities of the philosophical 
discussion regarding scientific explanation. In the following pages we will address the 




Scientific Explanation and Technology 
 
As we said above, we will address technology as a knowledge similar to scientific 
knowledge, but different from it regarding the level of practicality of its objectives and 
the way that they delimit the generality of the research. 
 
Now then, when talking about the relationship between science and technology, 
tradition has tended to see technology as a sub product of science. It is thought that 
technology simply makes use of scientific explanations; in this sense the 
epistemological accent is centered on science. In other words, traditionally it has been 
thought that technology simply holds still and waits for the understanding of the world 
given by scientific explanations. Examples often used to prove the previous point 
include the technological developments given after the discovery of nuclear fission in 
which scientific explanations that employed the atomic theory permitted technological 
development on the manipulation of the nucleus for military and energetic ends.  
 
Although there is no doubt that scientific explanations are of enormous importance for 
technological developments in such cases, the issue here is that this is the only 
relationship philosophers have explored between the concepts of explanation and 
technology, even though there are a large number of cases in which technological 
developments have anticipated any scientific explanations. In the following pages we 
will analyze a case in which, even though lacking a scientific theory to adequately 
interpret the data obtained by a new instrument, the technological knowledge of the 
                                                          
9 Wesley Salmon, “Scientific Explanation: Causation and Unification,” pp. 19, 20.  
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time was nonetheless able to generate the explanations that the scientific theory was 





Seeking to make the steam engine more efficient, James Watt found himself in the need 
to measure the variations of pressure during the machine’s cycle. In 1796 Watt, along 
with his assistant, John Southern, develops for this purpose the first pressure and 
volume indicator diagram.  
 
Back then the accepted scientific theory was the caloric theory. However, the 
explanation of the steam engine’s functioning was a real conundrum when trying to 
explain the efficiency of the machine at the end of the XVIII century. Applying the 
caloric theory Watt never managed to explain the relationship among pressure, the 
latent and sensible heats and the steam engine’s efficiency. Watt wanted to measure the 
pressure during the machine’s cycles because he thought that it affected the amount of 
latent heat, and thus, according to the caloric theory, the steams elasticity. However, 
after the invention of the indicator, it was necessary to discard the caloric theory and to 
create a whole new explanation to interpret the instruments’ results. Finally, based on 
the indicator’s measurements and a new conceptual framework, the machine’s 
efficiency began to be explained in relationship with the measurements of pressure, 
volume and work (Watt used the word ‘duty’ instead of ‘work’). What Watt discovered 
was that while tracing pressure and volume, the resulting area under the indicator 
diagram indicated the amount of work done by the machine. Even though in Watt’s day 
the concept of work didn’t form part of any theoretical framework, Watt and his 
contemporaries understood that the information given by the indicator could be used to 
measure the engine’s efficiency. While describing the development of the explanation 
of the steam engine’s functioning, Davis Baird states:  
 
We should not infer from this history that the substantive theory of heat or the 
lack of an established theory of work caused Watt or others to fundamentally 
misunderstand the information provided by the indicator[…] [it] did not cause 
him to understand the information supplied by the indicator as anything other 
than what we would now call the work produced by his engines. Watt used the 
term ‘duty’. On the other hand there was no theoretical framework within which 
to embed this newly measured quantity, ‘work’ or ‘duty’. We cannot say that 
Watt’s indicator measured a certain well-understood quantity –work– of a given 
physical system –the steam engine. Nonetheless, Watt’s indicator did measure 
work as we know think of it[…]10 
                                                          
10 Davis Baird, “Thing Knowledge: A Philosophy of Scientific Instruments,” pp. 171, 172. 
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Even though Watt was lacking a scientific theory competent to properly interpret the 
information given by the indicator, with the data given by it, the machine’s functioning 
was finally understood and properly explained, moreover, its efficiency was improved. 
I quote Baird once more:  
 
Nonetheless, those using the instrument were able to improve the performance 
of their engines. I suggest that the indicator operated “according to known 
principals” in the sense that the relation between efficiency and the area under 
the indicator diagram was easily recognized and applied[…]11  
 
Certainly the indicator provided knowledge on the machine’s efficiency and 
functioning. This knowledge, on the relationship between pressure, volume and work, 
produced a suitable explanatory framework of the machine’s activity that hadn’t been 
able to be explained by the caloric theory. What is most interesting is that that 
knowledge wouldn’t have been achieved if Watt had abided by the scientific 
knowledge of his time. The explanation was obtained throughout a technological 
invention. In fact, the measurements given by the steam and volume indicator diagram 
were baffling to the caloric theory. A new explanation had to be made in order to 
understand the steam engine’s functioning in a clearer and more suitable matter. Thus, 
it wasn’t a scientific theory that helped engineers understand and explain the steam 
engine’s functioning. The understanding and explanation of its efficiency was achieved 
throughout a measuring instrument. From the analyses on the relationship between 
pressure, volume and the area below the curve produced by these two measurements, a 
new concept was formulated: what nowadays is called ‘work’. Finally with a new 
conceptual framework, we were able to predict the engine’s efficiency based on the 
pressure applied and the volume changes within the machine’s cylinder.  
 
The new conceptual understanding of the data given by the indicator, not only allowed 
for the generation of a technological explanation of the steam engine’s efficiency and 
functioning, but was also, the starting point to elaborate a new scientific explanation 
different from the one given by the caloric theory. It was the new measurement, ‘work’, 
that Watt promoted as a useful measurement to compare the efficiency between steam 
engines, what years later Sadi Carnot would use as a main concept in the developing of 
thermodynamic theory. Giving a stable record on the changes of pressure, volume and 
work, the indicator provided a novel theoretical ground for the subsequent development 
of a new science. Hence, it was the development of the technological explanation 
obtained by the records of the indicator what created a new conceptual framework that 
would subsequently foster the creation of thermodynamic theory. This proves and 
openly illustrates that technology produces knowledge, moreover, it proves that not 
only do technological explanations exist, but that they even permit the development of 
new scientific theories.  
                                                          
11 Ibid., p. 178. 
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Conclusion 
 
The concept of explanation is an important concept to science. However, a careful 
revision on the way our knowledge progresses reveals to us that technology too offers 
worthy explanations of the world. As illustrated with the case of the explanation of the 
indicator’s data, technological explanations, just as scientific explanations, can help us 
answer how-questions. In this specific case the indicator’s data offered, undoubtedly, a 
different explanation on how the steam engine functioned than the one given by caloric 
theory. In the example, the technological explanation established causal relationships 
between pressure, volume and—the new concept—work. With a new conceptual 
framework, the technological explanation fostered with time the creation of 
thermodynamic theory. Undoubtedly thermodynamics widened the knowledge given by 
the indicator and then elaborated a theory that unified all the thermodynamic 
phenomena that surround us. Thus, properly understood the only difference between 
scientific and technological explanations resides in the fact that scientific explanations 
are of a wider generality than technological explanations.  
 
The lesson here is simple: we have to acknowledge that we still lack a sufficient 
comprehension on how scientific and technological knowledge relate with each other 
and feed back on one another. The simplistic view that technology is applied science 
must disappear, for it is a fact that technology is as rich as science in terms of 
knowledge and explanations.  
 
This paper has sought to emphasize the fact that technology, just as science, can offer 
us too explanations of the world. Both science and technology move on a continuum, 
on a relationship of interdependence that is much more complex than what tradition has 
allowed us to see. Under the philosophical tradition the topic of explanation has 
focused on the study of scientific explanation, but it is clear that we need to widen our 
view to include technological explanation as well. It is important to acknowledge 
technology’s epistemological role for only in this way can we achieve a better 
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